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NOTES 
ESTATE TAX-LIFE INSURANCE-Section 2035 As a 
Basis :for Including Life Insurance Proceeds 
in the Gross Estate of an lnsm·ed Who 
Paid Premiums on a Policy Owned 
hy Another Person 
If a decedent possessed any of the incidents of ownership1 of a 
life insurance policy, or if the policy proceeds were payable to his 
executor, the entire amount of the insurance proceeds is included 
in his estate for estate tax purposes under section 2042 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code).2 However, if the decedent had 
I. Among the incidents of ownership are included, generally, "the power to change 
the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an 
assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan 
against the surrender value of the policy, etc." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-l(c)(2) (1968). 
See Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1957) (right to change beneficiary); 
Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945) (right to cash surrender value); 
Prichard v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (right to assign policy 
as security for a loan); Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), afj'd, 195 F.2d 
735 (9th Cir. 1952) (right to cancel policies and obtain income from the cash surrender 
value); cf. Rev. Rul. 68-334, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 403. However, some interests in a 
policy, such as the right to dividends, are not considered "incidents of ownership." 
Old Point Nat'l Bank, 39 B.T .A. 343 (1939) (acq. 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 27); Blacksher v. 
Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 998 (1938) (acq. 1939-2 CuM. BuLL. 4). 
While it is clear that "incidents of ownership" generally refers to the right of an 
individual to control t4e disposition of the policy proceeds, there remains some ques-
tion as to the extent of control required. C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXES 279-81 (2d ed. 1962). It was once supposed that there must be "real," 
rather than "nominal," possession of the incidents of ownership before the proceeds 
from a policy would be included in a decedent's estate. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. 
v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1965), vacated, 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966). 
However, that theory was repudiated, and the district court's opinion thereaftet 
vacated, when the Supreme Court decided, in Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 
(1965), that the proceeds of an airline flight insurance policy taken out for one flight 
by the decedent shortly before a crash resulted in his death, were properly included 
in his estate under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, even though, 
on the facts of the case, it would have been impossible for the decedent to exercise 
any of the incidents of ownership. 
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. This section provides: 
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(!) Receivable by the executor.-To the extent of the amount receivable 
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent. 
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the amount receivable 
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent 
with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of 
ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. For 
purposes of the preceding sentence, the term "incident of ownership" includes a 
reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other 
instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest 
e..xceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the death of the 
decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary interest" includes a 
possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the policy, may return to the de-
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transferred ownership of the policy to another person in a transac-
tion that both met the requirements of section 20423 and was not 
regarded as "in contemplation of death,"4 but continued to pay the 
insurance premiums until his death, it is unclear whether any of 
the proceeds are includible in his estate under any other provision 
of the Code. 5 
Prior to 1954, proceeds from life insurance were generally6 in-
cluded in the gross estate of a decedent who had taken out the 
policy and paid premiums, even though ownership of the policy 
had been transferred to another person. From 1942 to 1954, a stat-
ute7 provided that the part of the insurance proceeds which was 
attributable to the premiums paid by the decedent should be in-
cluded.8 In the 1954 Code, this premium-payment test was deleted 
cedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power of disposition by him. The 
value of a revcrsionary interest at any time shall be determined (without regard 
to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation, including the 
use of tables of mortality and actuarial principles, pursuant to regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary or his delegate. In determining the value of a possibility 
that the policy or proceeds thereof may be subject to a power of disposition by 
the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such 
policy or proceeds may return to the decedent or his estate. 
3. The proceeds must not be made receivable by his executor upon decedent's 
death and the decedent must not retain any of the incidents of ownership. 
4. If a transfer is made more than three years prior to the date of death, it is 
conclusively presumed not to have been made in contemplation of death. INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b). If a transfer is made within three years of the date of death, 
it is presumed, rebuttably, to have been made in contemplation of death. INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b). The value of any property transferred "for adequate and 
full consideration in money or money's worth" will not be included in the estate 
under the provision for transfers in contemplation of death. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, 
§ 2035(a). As to various life motives which have been recognized with respect to the 
transfer of life insurance policies, see cases cited in note 64 infra. 
5. In particular, this Note is concerned with the applicability of the section 2035 
provision dealing with transfers in contemplation of death. The regulations pertain-
ing to section 2042 specifically indicate that a sum which is not includible under 
that section may nonetheless be includible under section 2035. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 
(a)(2) (1958). 
6. Before 1942, the statute was vague and the Treasury Department fluctuated be-
tween using and not using the premium-payment test. See I R. PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION § 10.13 (1942). 
7. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404, 56 Stat. 944 (1942), which became INT. REv. CODE OF 
1939, § 8ll(g). 
8. The premium-payment test, as used under the 1942 addition to the 1939 Code 
(see note 7 supra), provided for the inclusion of that part of the proceeds which bore 
the same proportion to the premiums paid by the decedent as the full amount of the 
proceeds bore to the total amount of premiums paid. If, for example, A insured his 
life for $100,000, paid $30,000 in premiums, irrevocably assigned the policy to B and 
then died after B had paid an additional $20,000 in premiums, the amount includible 
in A's estate would be three-fifths of $100,000-or $60,000-since A had paid three-
fifths of all the premiums. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 275. 
The fact that an individual could not avoid having some part of the proceeds 
included in his estate if he had paid any premiums led to the rejection of this test 
when the 1954 Code was enacted: "No other property is subject to estate tax where 
the decedent initially purchased it and then long before his death gave away all 
rights to the property and to discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not 
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from the section providing for the inclusion of life insurance pro-
ceeds. 9 However, the question has since arisen whether this test 
might be revived to include some portion of the proceeds in dece-
dent's estate under section 2035,10 the provision for transfers which 
are made in contemplation of death.11 
The question has been examined by various commentators;12 
many have concluded that at least some of the proceeds should be 
included,13 and all have recognized that such inclusion is a pos-
sibility. Generally, three theories have emerged.14 Under the first, 
the full amount of the proceeds would be included on the grounds 
that the transfer was not complete until the last premium was paid. 
No case has accepted this theory, and the commentators have recog-
nized that it 1s of limited significance at best.15 Under the second 
justified." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954). See also ALI, FEDERAL 
EsTATE AND GIFr TAX PROJECT STUDY xxii (Draft No. I 1965). 
9. See INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. There bas been some dissastisfaction with 
the current provision, since an individual may pass on unlimited amounts without 
paying any tax and, of course, the proceeds are not taxable to the beneficiary as 
income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § IOI. See C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note I, 
at 277. See also ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PROJECT 14 (1968). However, pro• 
posed changes in section 2042 have failed to obtain support. ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAX PROJECT 14 (1968). 
10. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. 
11. Under section 2035, only those payments made within three years of the date 
of the decedent's death could be considered. See note 4 supra. The premium-payment 
test, if used in conjunction with this section, would therefore provide for the in-
clusion of that part of the proceeds which bears the same proportion to the premiums 
paid by the decedent within three years of his death as the full amount of the pro• 
ceeds bears to the total amount of premiums paid. Thus, in the example used in 
note 8 supra, if A had transferred the $100,000 policy three years and one day before 
he died (after paying $30,000 in premiums), had continued-in contemplation of death 
-to pay the premiums, and had paid $20,000 in premiums between the time of the 
transfer and his death, two-fifths of $100,000, or $40,000, would be included in his 
estate since he had paid two fifths of the premiums within three years of his death. 
12. See, e.g., A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 324 (3d ed. 1962); Brown &: Sherman, 
Payment of Premiums as Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 101 TRUSTS &: EsTATI:S 
790 (1962); MacKay, Life Insurance in the Estate Plan, 43 B.U. L. R.Ev. 270, 273-75 
(1963); Mannheimer, Wheeler, &: Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the Insured, 
13 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL TAXATION 247, 260 (1955); Simmons, District Court 
Invalidates IRS' Three-Year Premium Payment Rule, 29 J. TAXATION 338 (1968); 
Yohlin &: Bomze, Some Unresolved Gift and Estate Tax Problems of the Unfunded 
Irrevocable Insurance Trust, 41 TAXES 521, 535-37 (1963); sources cited in note 13 
infra. 
13. C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 287; w. WARREN &: s. SURREY, FED• 
ERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 523 (1961 ed.); Goodson, Are Life Insurance Pro• 
ceeds Gifts in Contemplation of Death?, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 25 (1964); Schwartz, 
Life Insurance Estate Planning, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1961). 
14. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 11. 
15. The theory is based on the concept that the payment of the last premium was 
the effective cause of the payment of the proceeds to the beneficiary. It is probably 
applicable only to term policies, since it gives no effect to the payment of prior 
premiums. Yohlin &: Bomze, supra note 12, at 536. This approach suggests that an 
appropriate test for inclusion of proceeds should be the payment of the last premium. 
However, this is not one of the tests used under section 2042 and never has been a 
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theory, a revival of the premium-payment test, that part of the 
proceeds which is attributable to the premiums paid by the decedent 
in contemplation of death would be included in the decedent's gross 
estate. Several commentators have anticipated that the Internal 
Revenue Service would take this position,16 and by 1962 at least 
one district director of the Internal Revenue Service had adhered to 
it.17 In 1967 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 67-463,18 officially 
adopting this position, and a recent federal district court case has 
accepted that ruling.19 However, in another recent case, Gorman v. 
United States,20 the District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan expressly rejected the ruling and accepted the third theory: that 
only the actual amount of the premiums paid in contemplation of 
death should be included. 
Revenue Ruling 67-463 relied primarily21 on the 1945 decision 
test under previous provisions. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 271-91. 
It should also be noted that this theory rests on the implicit assumption that if the 
decedent had not paid the last premium no one else would have, although the policy 
owner would certainly have had an interest in maintaining the vitality of the policy. 
For a recent rejection of the theory, by way of dictum, see Goodnow v. United States, 
302 F.2d 516, 520 (Ct. CI. 1962). 
16. See authority cited note 13 supra. 
17. In Los Angeles. Brown & Sherman, supra note 12, at 790. However, the prac-
tice apparently was not universal among district directors; a 1965 case in which the 
theory would have been relevant did not even consider its application. LaMade v. 
Brownell, 245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1965). The decedent had paid premiums for 
two of the three years preceding his death on an insurance policy which he had 
long since transferred to his wife. Without discussing the payment of premiums, the 
court held that none of the proceeds of the policy were includible in his estate. 
18. 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 327. 
19. First Natl. Bank v. United States, 2 CCH FED. Esr. & GIFT TAX REP. (69-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas.) 11 12,574 (W.D. Te.x. Dec. 11, 1968). The position advanced by Revenue 
Ruling 67-463 was accepted without discussion. 
20. 2 CCH FED. Esr. & GIFT TAX REP. (68-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 11 12,553 (E.D. Mich. 
July 25, 1968). The government has informally indicated its intention not to appeal 
this case. FED. EsrATE & GIFT TAX REP. 142 (Feb. 11, 1969). 
21. The ruling also made reference to Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940); Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 
1967), reversing 43 T.C. 920 (1965); and Chase Natl. Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 
327 (1929). However, the support which these cases provide for the ruling seems 
limited. 
Lehman v. Commissioner was a reciprocal trust case quoted in the ruling for the 
proposition that "'[a] person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a 
trust is the settler, even though in form the trust is created by another ..• .' " 109 
F.2d at 100, quoting I A. Scorr, TRUSTS 785 (1939). Since the statement is quoted in 
the ruling without comment, the proposition for which it is supposed to stand may be 
open to question. It may be intended to indicate that if a decedent paid an insurance 
company to give the proceeds to the beneficiary he should be considered as having 
given those proceeds himself. This, however, is merely the basis for the use of the 
premium-payment test in the first instance. Since the test has been repudiated by 
Congress (see note 35 infra and accompanying te.xt), there seems to be no reason to 
revive the test purely on the basis of this theory. Furthermore, the propriety of 
reasoning even this far from an isolated statement concerning reciprocal trusts is 
itself questionable. If the statement was intended to support the point that the 
result reached by the ruling would be the same if the decedent transferred the policy 
other than in contemplation of death or if the policy was originally owned by an-
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of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Liebmann v. Has-
sett,22 the case which has been universally recognized23 as providing 
a rationale for the revival of the premium-payment test. Liebmann 
involved the taxation24 of proceeds from life insurance policies 
which the decedent gave to his wife in contemplation of death. The 
First Circuit relied on Professor Randolph Paul's deductions from 
the existence of the premium-payment test under other sections of 
the applicable Code25 and held that although the proceeds (rather 
than the cash value of the policies on the date of transfer) should 
be included in the gross estate, that portion of the proceeds at-
tributable to the premiums paid by the wife should be excluded. 
other, its use was probably legitimate (Simmons, supra note 12, at 339), but unneces-
sary (see note 27 infra); and the case cannot then provide support for the basic 
position taken in the ruling. 
Scott v. Commissioner was a community property case. In that part of the opinion 
relevant to Revenue Ruling 67-463, the Ninth Circuit used the amount of premiums 
paid from the decedent's separate funds to determine the extent of his ownership 
interest in the policy, the value of which was then included in his gross estate pur-
suant to section 2042. See Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967); 
Rev. Rul. 67-228, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 331. 
In Chase Natl. Bank v. United States, the Supreme Court was merely concerned 
with whether payment by an insurer could be considered a transfer by the decedent 
so that the tax could be considered a tax upon the transfer and, therefore, constitu• 
tional. The decedent was the owner of the policy and the proceeds were included 
under a provision relating to policies owned by a decedent, Revenue Act of 1921, 
§ 402, 42 Stat. (pt. 1) 278 (1921). The Court did indicate that the includible amount 
was the value of that which was received by the beneficiary rather than the cost to 
the decedent, but it did not consider whether this would be the case if the de-
cedent had no ownership interest in the policy. 
22. 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945). 
23. See authorities cited in notes 12 and 13 supra. 
24. Under the Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 70 (1926), as amended, 
Revenue Act of 1934, § 404, 48 Stat. 754 (1934). 
25. Professor Paul argued that the amount included in an estate under the pro-
vision for transfers in contemplation of death should not be greater than the amount 
which would be included if there had been no transfer. R. PAUL, supra note 6, at 551 
n.9. If, under section 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (the statute relevant to the 
Liebmann case), there had been no transfer of the policy, the gross estate would in• 
clude proceeds only from policies "taken out" by the decedent. This would not in-
clude any portion of the proceeds attributable to payments made by another person, 
since, under the relevant regulations at that time, the premium-payment test was in 
use. See R. PAUL, supra note 6, at 512-14. 
Section 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926 provided for the inclusion in the gross 
estate of all property "[t]o the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as 
insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the 
extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries 
as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life." 44 Stat. 
(pt. 2) 71 (1926). A 1941 amendment to the 1937 regulations had interpreted "taken 
out": 
Where a portion of the premiums or other consideration was actually paid by 
another and the remaining portion by the decedent, either directly or indirectly, 
such insurance is considered to have been taken out by the latter in the propor-
tion that the payments therefor made by him bear to the total amount paid for 
the insurance. 
Treas. Reg. 80, art. 25, T.D. 5032, 1941-1 CuM. BuLL. 427, 428. 
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Assuming that some part of the proceeds should be included in the 
gross estate, the Liebmann case supports the position taken in the 
ruling; Liebmann resulted in the inclusion of the part of the in-
surance proceeds attributable to premiums paid by the decedent-
insured. But the question is whether there is-under the Code 
provisions now prevailing-a sound basis for extending the Lieb-
mann principle to the situation presented in Gorman, as the revenue 
ruling has done. 
In Gorman the district court held that the Liebmann principle 
should not be so extended. The decedent's wife had apparently26 
taken out the policy originally; thus, no transfer of the policy itself 
was involved. But, the revenue ruling explicitly states that this fact 
would not affect the conclusion which it advances.27 All of the 
premiums were paid by the decedent, who died approximately one 
year after the policy had been issued. The Government asserted 
that since all the premium payments were made in contemplation 
of death, all of the policy proceeds should be included in the gross 
estate pursuant to section 2035. 
The court rejected this contention, distinguishing Liebmann on 
the ground that in that case there was implicit support for using a 
premium-payment test, because such a test would have been used 
under the then applicable Code provisions28 to determine the tax-
ability of proceeds from policies transferred to another whether or 
not the transfer was in contemplation of death.29 Since this test was 
deliberately eliminated from the income tax law in 1954, when sec-
tion 2042 was enacted, the court stated that the premium-payment 
concept should not now be reintroduced under section 2035. Fur-
thermore, the court suggested that if the theory relied on in Lieb-
mann-that an amount should not be included in the gross estate 
under the contemplation-of-death provision unless it would be 
included if there had been no transfer30-was followed in Gorman, 
only the amount of the premiums paid should be included. Thus, 
26. The court did not decide whether the decedent or his wife was the original 
owner of the policy. The matter is not easily determined, since the decedent made 
all the arrangements for the issuance of the policy, but it was issued listing his wife 
as the owner. 'Whether this constitutes a transfer by the decedent is apparently an 
open question. Simmons, supra note 12, at 339-40. For purposes of discussion, it is 
assumed that the wife was the original owner of the policy and that the Gorman 
case is in direct conflict with Revenue Ruling 67-463. 
27. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 327, 328. Although it might be thought 
that Gorman could be distinguished from the ruling on this basis, the IRS position 
on this issue appears sound. If a policy has been transferred other than in contempla-
tion of death it must, for estate tax purposes, be treated as though the decedent 
never owned it. Therefore, the same result must follow in the situation in which 
another person originally owned the policy. 
28. See note 25 supra. 
29. See C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 274-75. 
30. See note 25 supra. 
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dismissing the other cases relied on by the ruling more or less sum-
marily, 31 the court concluded that the decedent's transfer in con-
templation of death consisted only of the amount of the premiums 
which he had paid.32 
It is submitted that the Gorman court's rejection of revenue 
ruling 67-463 was appropriate. In the first place, it is essential to 
realize that Congress did repudiate the premium-payment test as 
applied in the section specifically concerning inclusion of life in-
surance proceeds in the gross estate.33 When this matter was under 
consideration prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, a minority 
of the House Ways and Means Committee vigorously opposed the 
removal of the test.34 Both the Senate and the House Reports dis-
cussed the question,35 but when enacted, the Code did not provide 
for the use of the premium-payment test.36 In 1957 an attempt was 
made to re-establish the test,37 but it was defeated. This legislative 
history strongly suggests that the premium-payment test should not 
be applied under section 2035 to accomplish the result which Con-
gress sought to avoid by eliminating that test from section 2042. As 
suggested above, congressional rejection of the premium-payment 
test indicates that the Liebmann case, which relied on the existence 
of the test38 under the Revenue Act of 1926, should be disregarded 
under the present Code. Other differences between the present Code 
provisions and those relevant to Liebmann also lead to this conclu-
sion; Liebmann would be decided differently under the present 
law. When the Revenue Act of 1942 was passed, the test applied in 
Liebmann was replaced by a provision calling for inclusion of pro-
ceeds if the decedent had paid premiums39 or possessed any incidents 
31. Largely for the reasons indicated in note 21 supra. 
32. Having distinguished Liebmann, the court based its decision on four major 
considerations. First, the right to pay premiums belongs to the owner of the policy, 
and since the decedent's wife was the owner, the disposition of the premium amounts 
was under her control. The policy proceeds could not, therefore, be properly identi-
fied with decedent's premium payments. See MacKay, supra note 12, at 275; cf. Walker 
v. United Order of The Golden Star, Inc., 212 Mass. 289, 98 N.E. 1039 (1912). Second, 
Congress has clearly indicated that the premium-payment test is not generally ap-
propriate. See note 33 infra and accompanying text. Third, the donee benefited only 
by the amount of the premium paid. Of course, this conclusion depends completely 
on the assumption that if the decedent had not paid the premiums his wife would 
have. Finally, the court reasoned that it is the nature of the insurance contract itself 
which enhances the value of the premiums rather than any process analogous to the 
growth in value of a trust res. See also Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516, 519-
20 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
33. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 276. 
34. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Bl4-15 (1954). 
35. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d 
Cong., 2d Sess. A316-17 (1954). 
36. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. 
37. H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 56 (1957). 
38. See note 25 supra, and accompanying text. 
39. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 944 (1942), which became INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1939, § 8ll(g)(2)(A). 
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of ownership.40 Under this section it was consistently held that pay-
ment of premiums by another person was irrelevant-if the decedent 
had possessed any incidents of mvnership of a policy or if he had 
transferred them to another person in contemplation of death (as in 
Liebmann), the full amount of the policy proceeds would be in-
cluded in the gross estate.41 Under the 1954 Code, the courts have 
continued to hold that if the decedent retained any incidents of 
mvnership, no part of the policy proceeds may be excluded merely 
because some of the premiums were paid by another.42 Since ex-
clusion of part of the proceeds-permitted in Liebmann-can no 
longer be obtained, that case does not, under the present Code, 
provide logical support for the position taken in the revenue 
ruling.43 
Since the Liebmann case fails to support the Government's posi-
tion,44 it is important to examine analogous cases in the area of 
transfers in contemplation of death. Specifically, it is submitted that 
among the various analogies which might be drmvn, the payment of 
premiums by a decedent is most similar to a gift of cash from a 
decedent invested by his donee upon receipt-a case in which only 
the cash amount would be included in the estate.45 
Although there are few cases concerning the valuation of gifts 
made in contemplation of death when one donee did not retain the 
original property,4° some generalizations can be made. If a gift is 
40. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 944 (1942), which became INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1939, § 81l(g)(2)(B). 
41. See, e.g., Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959); Fried v. Granger, 
105 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Pa. 1952), afj'd, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953); Estate of Collino 
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956); Estate of Goldblatt v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 
204 (1951). 
42. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965); Estate of Piggott 
v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965). 
43. It has also been suggested that even if the Liebmann result were possible 
under the present Code, application of the Liebmann principle to the Gorman facts 
is inappropriate since there is an essential difference between the payment of a 
premium by a donee (as in Liebmann) and the payment by a donor (as in Gorman). 
Yohlin &: Ilomze, supra note 12, at 535-36. While this may be true, it is difficult to 
determine why this difference should, of itself, lead to a different tax result. 
44. Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code there was explicit provision for the 
use of the premium-payment test in the section concerning life insurance (see notes 6 
and 7 supra), so litigation over the use of the test did not often arise. Under the 
1954 Code, Gorman and First Natl. Dank v. United States, 2 CCH FED. EsT. &: GIFI' 
TAX REP. (69-1 U.S. Ta.x Cas.) ,I 12,574 (W.D. Tex. Dec. II, 1968) are the only relevant 
cases, and both were decided after the issuance of the Ruling. 
45. In Gorman, the Government was willing to concede that an outright gift in 
the amount of the premium would be includible only at the cash· value. Simmons, 
supra note 12, at 339. 
46. C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note I, at 435. It should be noted that the 
Code provides for the inclusion of "all property •.. of which the decedent has made 
a transfer in contemplation of death" at "the value at the time of his death." INT. 
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. This seems to imply that the sale and reinvestment by 
the donee of property transferred to him in contemplation of death are irrelevant, 
and tl1at the value of the property, whoever owns it, should be the includible amount. 
If a transfer is revocable, this result does not follow, since the transfer in such a case 
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irrevocable and consists of a specific asset, the value of that asset on 
the date of the decedent's death47 should be included in his gross 
estate, even if the donee no longer owns the asset. 48 When the gift 
is of cash, the cash amount will be included in the estate without 
regard to any reinvestment by the donee. 49 If a gift is in trust, the 
amount included in the estate will be the value of the trust res60 on 
the date of the decedent's death, whether or not the assets in the 
trust are identical to those which were originally transferred to it.lit 
The characterization of a life insurance premium payment within 
this context is difficult. It is similar to a gift of a specific asset in 
that the value of the gift to the donee is an increase in the value of 
the life insurance policy. It can also be viewed as similar to a gift of 
cash in that the donor parts with money and has no ultimate control 
over the eventual disposition of the transfer.02 Finally, such pay-
ment may be likened to a gift in trust since the value of the gift is 
enhanced without action by the donor or the donee and the amount 
is held by a third party for eventual distribution to the beneficiary. li3 
The purpose of section 2035 suggests that the analogy to a gift 
of cash is the most appropriate.54 That section is intended to pre-
is not complete until the decedent's death. See Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986, 
989-90 (5th Cir. 1942). Apart from the logic of this conclusion, a revocable transfer 
will be included pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038. See also INT. REV. CODE 
OF 1954, § 2036(a)(2). 
47. The Code also provides for an alternative valuation date, generally one year 
after the decedent's death. In this Note, as in the Code, "date of death" should be 
read to mean date of death or alternative valuation date. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 2032(b). 
48. Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 
U.S. 817 (1947); Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-l(e) (1958); Lowndes &: Stephens, Identification 
of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax, 65 l\I1cH. L. REv. 105, 140 (1966). There 
is, however, dictum in Estate of Kroger, 12 P-H TAX CT. Mat. ,r 43,392 (1943), 
affd, 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 866 (1945), indicating 
that the includible amount is the value of the assets actually held by the donee at 
the date of the decedent's death. If the gift is revocable, this will certainly be the 
value included in the decedent's estate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038; Howard v. 
United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942); Whited v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 947 
(W.D. La. 1963); C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 437. 
49. Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 
U.S. 817 (1947). See note 45 supra. 
50. Income accumulated by the trust will not usually be considered a part of the 
res. See note 54 infra. 
51. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935); Estate of Kroger, 12 
P-H TAX CT. MEM. ,f 43,392 (1943), afj'd, 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 
324 U.S. 866 (1945); C. LOWNDES &: R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 435. 
52. Both because the insured can pay the premiums only with the owner's consent, 
MacKay, supra note 12, at 275; cf. Walker v. United Order of The Golden Star, Inc., 
212 Mass. 289, 98 N.E. 1039 (1912); and because the owner may at any time terminate 
the insurance policy and obtain the cash surrender value. 
53. The analogy to a trust is the most unsatisfactory. See note 54 infra. Since the 
owner of an insurance policy may surrender it and obtain the cash surrender value, 
the analogous trust would be one that is terminable at will by the beneficiary. 
54. The Government apparently disagrees: "A premium payment ..• is analogous 
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vent avoidance of the estate tax by returning to the estate that which 
would have been in it absent transfers in contemplation of death.55 
Thus, the characteristics of premium payments which should be 
relevant are those which relate to the transferor and the effect of 
the transfer on his estate. The value of the gift to the donee should 
be irrelevant, as should any external similarities to a trust. The 
central consideration should be that if the insured had not paid 
the premiums his estate would have been larger by only the 
premium amount. More important, if he had not paid the premiums, 
no part of the policy proceeds would have been in his estate. Re-
turning his estate to what it would have been without the transfer 
simply requires treating the premium payments as gifts of cash and 
including only the premium amount in the estate. On the specific 
facts of Gorman, this conclusion is even more compelling. '\1/here 
the policy owner has been someone other than the decedent from 
the beginning and the insured's only active connection with the 
policy has been the payment of premiums, the argument that he 
to a gift of specific property •••. Unlike the unrestricted gift of money, a premium 
payment is a gift of insurance protection, a transfer of an interest in the policy which 
is transmuted at death into the proceeds of the policy." Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 Cul\f. 
BULL. 327, 328. However, it may be questioned whether a premium payment can 
legitimately be called a transfer of an interest in the policy. The decedent could have 
transferred an interest in the policy only if he had such an interest to transfer. Estate 
of Karagheusian, 23 T.C. 806, 814 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 197 (2d 
Cir. 1956) (acq. as to another issue, 1955-2 CuM. BuLL. 7). If, however, the decedent 
did have such an interest, section 2042(b) would apply to make the proceeds in-
cludiblc, and the Government's reliance on section 2035 would be unnecessary. In-
deed, this reliance on section 2035 may be taken as an admission that the decedent 
had no interest in the policy; thus, the Government's argument is self-defeating. 
See Brown &: Sherman, supra note 12, at 790. 
It is also important to note that income from a trust is not included in the estate 
[INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035, Treas. Reg. 20.2035-l(e) (1958); McGehee v. Com-
mis~ioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958); Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, 196 F.2d 813 
(7th Cir. 1952) (acq. 1966-1 Cm,r. BULL. 2); Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th 
Cir. 1949) (acq. 1966-1 Cu~r. BULL. 2)], although accumulated income may be included 
if the decedent has retained the power to determine the distribution of income [INT. 
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038; United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); 
Commissioner v. Hager's Estate, 173 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1949)]. This fact provides 
additional support for including only the cash value of the premium payments in the 
c:statc, for it indicates that an increase in the value of the transfer not attributable 
to an increase in the market value of the u·ansferred asset itself should not be in-
cluded. The maturation of a life insurance contract is certainly not attributable to 
an increase in the value of the money given by the donor; therefore, the proceeds 
should not be included. 
55. Igkheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704, 709 (5th Cir. 1935); C. LOWNDES & R. 
KRAMER, supra note 1, at 60. With this in mind, it may be questioned whether the 
disparate treatment of gifts in trust and outright gifts is proper, for the effect on the 
donor's estate is identical in both cases. See Pavenstedt, Taxation of Transfers in 
Contemplation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition, 54 YALE L.J. 70, 88-90 (1944). The 
special treatment of trusts has, however, been characterized as "sensible.'' C. LOWNDES 
& R. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 435. See also Lowndes & Stephens, supra note 48, at 
139. 
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paid the premiums in order to avoid having the policy proceeds in 
his estate is not persuasive. 
The result reached in Gorman is also desirable because it is con-
sistent with other tax provisions. Under section 2036, which deals 
with transfers with a retained life estate, it has been held that 
premiums cannot be identified with policy proceeds for the purpose 
of equating the payment of premiums with a transfer of the policy 
and, hence, of the proceeds.56 Indeed, it has even been held that the 
payment of premiums coupled with a failure to alter a provision 
that income from proceeds of a policy on the life of decedent's 
husband would go to the decedent for life and then to others did not 
constitute a transfer of those proceeds by the decedent.57 Certainly 
these cases tend to refute the argument that a decedent, by paying 
premiums, transfers an interest in the policy. Similarly, the gift tax 
regulations58 indicate that the payment of a premium is a gift in the 
amount of the premium rather than a gift of any interest in the 
policy itself.59 Finally, in Hyde v. Commissioner,60 a 1962 income 
tax case, the Second Circuit held that payment of premiums by 
someone other than the tax.payer must be reported as income and 
that the appropriate amount to report is the premium amount rather 
than the increase in the cash value of the policy. The fact that the 
Gorman approach is consistent with other tax provisions is an im-
portant consideration in assessing the validity of Revenue Ruling 
67-463. 
Thus, the better-reasoned view appears to be that when a dece-
dent has transferred a life insurance policy to another person, 61 
other than in contemplation of death, but has continued to pay the 
premiums, only the actual amount of the premiums paid should be 
included in his gross estate. This is also the preferable result in the 
somewhat different factual context assumed to exist in Gorman, 62 
where the policy was never transferred but was owned originally 
by the decedent's wife. 
However, it is not entirely clear that this was the actual situation 
in Gorman. The court stated that it made no difference whether 
the wife owned the policy originally or the decedent took it out and 
56. Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
57. National City Bank v. United States, 371 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1966). 
58. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-l(h)(S) (1958). 
59. The Government itself contends that the federal estate ta.x and the federal 
gift tax are to be construed in pari materia. Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516, 
520 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
60. 301 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1962). This case is another indication that the payment 
of premiums should not be identified with the increased value of the policy. 
61. Provided, of course, that the proceeds are not payable to the estate and that 
the decedent had not retained any of the incidents of ownership, since either of these 
factors would trigger the operation of section 2042. 
62. See note 26 supra. 
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transferred it to her later.63 That statement is clearly wrong, for 
two reasons. First, if the decedent did transfer the policy to his wife, 
that transfer was probably in contemplation of death since he died 
within one year of the alleged transfer and the court did determine 
that he had paid the premiums in contemplation of death. Such a 
transfer would have been covered by section 2035, and the entire 
amount of the proceeds would have been includible in the gross 
estate. Second, even if the policy was not actually transferred in 
contemplation of death,64 that very question would certainly require 
the court's consideration if a transfer of the policy was involved in 
the case. Whether the decedent or his wife was the original owner of 
the policy would therefore make some difference, at least in terms 
of the analysis of the case. 
Because of this factual uncertainty, it is impossible to draw final 
conclusions about the propriety of the Gorman decision. It is neces-
sary to know whether the decedent transferred the policy to his wife 
or whether she owned it from the outset; if there was a transfer, we 
should also determine whether or not it was accomplished in con-
templation of death. If the wife was the original owner of the policy, 
or if the transfer to her was not in contemplation of death, it is sub-
mitted that Gorman was correct in rejecting Revenue Ruling 67-463 
and including only the amount of the premiums paid in the dece-
dent's gross estate. 
63. "[U]nder either the plaintiff's theory that decedent had no interest in the policy 
other than payment of the premium, or under the government's theory that the plain-
tiff (sic] had interest [sic] in the policy and did transfer the policy, we are still limited 
to an amount equal to the premium." 2 CCH FED. EsT. & GIFT TAX REP. (68-2 U.S. 
Tax Cas.) ,r 12,553, at 8799 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 1968). It appears that the question 
of whether a policy has been transferred when one individual makes all the arrange-
ments for issuance of the policy but it is issued with another person named as the 
owner is still open. Simmons, supra note 12, at 339-40. 
64. While the transfer of a life insurance policy might seem to be naturally as-
sociated with contemplation of death [Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955, 
956-57 (2d Cir. 1950); cf. Diamond's Estate v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 
1947); Davidson's Estate v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1946)], such is not 
necessarily the case. Various other motives for such a transfer have been recognized; 
see, e.g., Estate of Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963) (acq. 1964-2 Cu11r. 
BULL. 6); Flick's Estate v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948); Cronin's Estate 
v. Comi~sioner, 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947); Bruns v. United States, 62-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. ,r 12,112 (N.D. Cal. 1962); Estate of Hunt v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1182 (1950). 
The payment of premiums would seem even less necessarily associated with con-
templation of death than the transfer of a policy. See Brown & Sherman, supra note 
12, at 791; cf. Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946); Estate of Hull v. Commissioner, 
325 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963) (acq. 1964-2 Cu11r. BULL. 6). Where there is no transfer of 
the policy involved, the question of includibility of proceeds does not even arise unless 
it is first determined that the premiums were paid in contemplation of death. 
